Federal Circuit Weighs Limits of Section 1498 Immunity in Moderna COVID-19 Vaccine Dispute
- November 17, 2026
- Snippets
The parties in Arbutus v. Moderna (D. Del., No. 1:22-cv-00252), joined by the federal government in oral argument, expounded to a panel of the Federal Circuit on whether the district court erred in its decision that distribution of almost a half billion doses of Moderna’s SpikeVax vaccine against SARS-Cov-19 (“COVID 19”) did not fall within the ambit of the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) shielding them from infringement liability and giving Arbutus the sole recourse of bringing suit in the Court of Federal Claims against the U.S. government. The parties had settled all other aspects of this litigation earlier this year (see, Moderna Settles Patent Litigation with Arbutus et al.), with Moderna making an immediate $950 million payment (paid in July) that settled all infringement damage liability and a provision for a further $1.3 billion in damages to be paid by Moderna depending on the outcome of Moderna’s appeal regarding whether Section 1498 limited Arbutus’s recourse to recovery from the government before the Court of Federal Claims.
Turning the issues somewhat on their head (at least regarding the vigor with which the arguments unfolded), Arbutus argued that there were two bases for affirming the district court decision in its favor. The first was that Moderna’s manufacture of the COVID vaccines at issue was not “for the government” but rather for the American people, and second that the use of the method of treatment constituted an inducement to infringe not within the scope of Section 1498. Arbutus seemed to seek to avoid the “for the government” argument — that is, letting the appeal turn on whether that language mandated the outcome in Moderna’s favor — and instead highlighted the difference (as it argued) between direct infringement by the government in manufacturing the vaccine (which Arbutus conceded fell under the scope of 1498) and indirect infringement (inducing infringement) by Moderna. That inducement theory depended on 1) infringement by administering vaccine doses to the public and 2) advertising that, by analogy, satisfied the inducing infringement standard set out in Hikma v. Amarin. Manufacture of vaccine doses was not infringing per se, Arbutus conceded, but the act of administering them infringed method claim 16 of the ‘435 patent (“A method for the in vivo delivery of a nucleic acid, the method comprising administering to a mammalian subject a nucleic acid-lipid particle of claim 1”) for which the government did not waive sovereign immunity. Arbutus argued that private individuals were direct infringers with regard to administering the vaccine (by an apocryphal “Jane from Topeka going into CVS” to be vaccinated) and not the government. Counsel further set out the scenario that, under Moderna’s interpretation, there would be circumstances like this one where Arbutus would be left without a remedy.
Upon reflection (and not unappreciated by the panel from the tenor of its questioning), the flaw in this reasoning was that the purpose of Section 1498 would be thwarted should the government merely have the ability to make the vaccine and not the ability to have citizens other than the military, members of the government, and others directly within its ambit actually receive the vaccine, and not to be able to have Moderna, doctors, and pharmacies use the vaccine to vaccinate the population.
Moderna’s position was that it was the COVID vaccine manufacturer “for the government,” who turned over vaccine vials to the government (or to whomever the government directed them to turn them over), and that the government decided where the vials went and to whom they were distributed. Moderna was cautious in response to Judge Taranto’s hypothetical regarding whether the government could use Section 1498 to take over pharmaceuticals generally, invoking other statutory provisions regarding authorization and consent that would preclude or constrain such practices (Judge Dyk helpfully positing that this hypothetical could raise questions of misuse of government procurement systems). As for the advertisement issue, Moderna argued that such advertisements were by the federal government to state and local governments as part of “Operation Warp Speed” and not directly to the public (apparently subsequent advertisements to the public were by those other governmental entities). Judge Dyk and Moderna’s counsel both deemed the district court’s conclusion that Section 1498 did not encompass inducement of infringement “clearly not correct.” Responding to questioning from Judge Taranto, Moderna’s counsel argued that the word “entire” in the statute regarding the remedy for the complaining patentee means that inducement is part of the manufacture (at least as to the package insert produced with the vaccines), as was the case here. Moderna’s counsel also cautioned Judge Taranto that any time the government entered into contracts involving patents did not automatically mean that Section 1498 was necessarily triggered, regardless of what the government does with otherwise infringing manufactures.
The government for its part focused on the harm that would arise should the district court’s decision be affirmed, including the potential for injunctions (not in a pandemic case, as Judge Taranto noted, due to the public interest prong of the test, but in others). This provided perhaps the strongest point for protecting the government’s interests, because if “inducing” infringement of claims for administering manufactures protected by Section 1498 were outside its scope the government could get the infringing product made but not be able to use it without that risk.
It is perhaps foolish to try to conclude how a panel will rule based on oral argument, where judges often question most closely counsel whose position a judge is testing for unappreciated weaknesses. The only hint for how at least one judge may have been thinking was the question (to Arbutus’s counsel) of whether the Court could reverse on direct infringement and affirm on induced infringement, while another panel member said these are separate questions and yet another that some claims will survive and others would not, and further also asserted that it would be remarkable to distinguish direct and indirect infringement under these circumstances. It may turn out that the question before the Court is not deemed as clear cut as many have expected, but that must wait for a decision likely to be rendered in relatively short due course.
